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The public finance literature demonstrates the equivalence between consumption and labor 
income (wage) taxes. We construct an environment in which individuals make real labor-
leisure choices and spend their earned income on real goods. We use this experimental 
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identical labor-leisure allocation. Despite controlling for subjects’ work ability and inherent 
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Since Hobbes (1651) and continuing with Mill (1871), the question of whether to tax con-
sumption or income has occupied a central place in tax policy debate. In January 2005,
President George W. Bush commissioned a panel to provide recommendations that would
simplify the existing federal tax code and render it more equitable, eﬃcient and conducive
to economic growth (President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform 2005). The panel consid-
ered numerous national sales tax plans to replace the entire income tax system as well as
a detailed value added tax program to allow for a reduction in individual and corporate
income tax rates. The complexity of replacing the current tax code with a broad-based
consumption tax system inhibited the panel from reaching a consensus. Notwithstanding,
such a shift remains high on the tax reform agenda.
The classic Haig-Simons deﬁnition (according to which income equals consumption plus
changes in wealth (savings)) highlights that the major distinction between an income tax (on
all income sources) and a consumption tax is the former’s taxation of savings. The taxation
of savings distorts the taxpayer’s intertemporal consumption allocation, an often-invoked
argument in favor of shifting to a consumption tax. In a second-best setting, redistributive
goals may justify the taxation of savings despite its distortive eﬀects. A long public ﬁnance
literature beginning with Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) (AS) addresses the desirability of using
commodity taxation for redistributive purposes as a supplement to an optimal labor income
(wage) tax. Using Mirrlees’ (1971) standard setting, AS show that when preferences over
the set of consumption goods are separable from leisure, the optimal commodity tax must
be uniform; namely, all consumption goods are subject to the same tax rate. An implication
of this pioneering result is that future and present consumption should be taxed at the
same rate. In other words, the taxation of savings is undesirable. AS and the subsequent
1literature1 are premised on the equivalence between a wage tax and a consumption tax.2 In
fact, wage taxes can be thought as pre-paid consumption taxes, while consumption taxes like
the VAT and retail sales taxes are viewed as post-paid consumption taxes. In the absence
of behavioral evidence of any sort, the literature regards these two taxes as equivalent.
In this paper, we oﬀer an experimental test of the equivalence between consumption and
wage taxes. We hypothesize that the diﬀerential timing in the imposition of these two taxes
leads to diﬀerent labor-leisure choices, thereby violating the equivalence. Wage taxes are col-
lected upon receipt of one’s labor market income, while consumption taxes are deferred until
one spends this income. The widespread behavioral phenomena of overeating (O’Donoghue
and Rabin 1999) and credit card debt funded consumption (Angeletos et al. 2001) suggest
that when the rewards from an activity are experienced immediately but the costs are borne
later, individuals engage excessively in the activity. Analogously, we anticipate that indi-
viduals will work more when they derive a beneﬁt early on (i.e., earned income) and only
later incur a cost (i.e., tax levied on consumption) rather than when the cost is incurred
simultaneously with the receipt of the beneﬁt, as in the case of a wage tax.
We test whether the theoretical equivalence between labor income and consumption taxes
is upheld or whether our behavioral hypothesis regarding the diﬀerential timing of the taxes
ﬁnds support. We introduce an incentivized, two-stage individual choice problem that re-
quires subjects to allocate their time between leisure and a real-eﬀort task. Their perfor-
mance at the real-eﬀort task earns them income, which they allocate in the second stage
between two consumption goods. We design equivalent labor income tax (IT) and consump-
1 Deaton (1979) shows that even when labor income tax is restricted to be linear (ﬂat rate cum universal
demo grant), separability and homotheticity of preferences render commodity taxation redundant. More
recently, Saez (2002) extends the AS framework to allow for preference heterogeneity and Kaplow (2006)
demonstrates that commodity taxation may be redundant even when the labor income tax schedule is not
set at the optimum.
2 In a neo-classical framework, any two tax schedules that yield the same choice set for a rational individual
should have no impact on individual choice (nor on government ﬁscal considerations) and hence should be
equivalent for tax design. The public ﬁnance literature demonstrates the equivalency of several other pairs
of tax instruments that are prima facie diﬀerent. Notable examples include social security taxes levied on
employees and employers and commodity taxes imposed on producers and consumers.
2tion tax (CT) treatments. In IT, a 50-percent ﬂat wage tax is imposed on earned income.
In CT, a 100-percent ad-valorem tax is levied on both consumption goods. Notice that
both tax regimes entail a 50-percent erosion in the individual’s purchasing power without
changing the relative prices of the consumption goods. Controlling for diﬀerences in labor
market productivity and inherent labor-leisure preferences using pre-tax treatments, we test
whether these two equivalent tax regimes in fact lead to identical labor-leisure choices.
Our results reveal that the temporal separation between an individual’s labor market
allocation and subsequent consumption decisions leads individuals to work longer when faced
with a consumption tax than with an equivalent wage tax. This diﬀerential labor supply
response across tax treatments holds over the entire range of labor market abilities and
is persistent over time. This ﬁnding bears major implications for tax policy design by
establishing a novel argument for shifting to a consumption tax base.
While ours is the ﬁrst test of the equivalence between an income and a consumption
tax, several authors have tested experimentally the equivalence between the economic and
statutory incidence of a unit commodity tax (also known as liability side tax equivalence
theorem) (see Borck et al. 2001, Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (KK) 2000, Riedl and Tyran
2005 and Ruﬄe 2005). The results from these papers suggest that whether the economic
incidence of a unit tax is, in fact, independent of the side of the market that bears the
statutory incidence, as the theory predicts, depends on the competitiveness of the market.3
Our paper contributes to a recent fast-growing strand in the public ﬁnance literature on
the misperception of taxes. Krishna and Slemrod (2003) oﬀer a general discussion of the
eﬃciency-enhancing role of various tax frames in the presence of individuals’ misperception.
Sausgruber and Tyran (2004) demonstrate that buyers systematically underestimate the tax
burden of a tax levied on sellers and the consequences of this misperception for preferences for
redistribution. Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) and Feldman and Katuscak (2006) focus on
3 KK represents the lone violation of the theory and their test uses a bilateral-monopoly market structure.
3individuals’ misperception of the diﬀerence between marginal and average tax rates. Based
on a grocery store ﬁeld experiment and empirical state-level data on alcohol sales, Chetty et
al. (2007) show that posting sales-tax-inclusive prices renders the tax more salient and thus
reduces consumer demand relative to adding the sales tax at the cash register.4
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we detail the experimental
design. Section 3 presents the main results. In section 4, we present a simple theoretical
framework consistent with our ﬁndings and discuss policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
To test the equivalency between labor income and consumption taxes, we design two tax
systems that yield identical after-tax budget lines, thereby creating identical labor-leisure in-
centives. In a between-subjects design, we determine whether subjects indeed make the same
labor-leisure allocation as predicted by the theory or whether, according to our alternative
hypothesis, subjects choose to work more in the consumption-tax condition. This compari-
son of labor-leisure choices in equivalent labor income tax and consumption tax treatments
is the third part of our three-part experiment. The ﬁrst two parts of the experiment are
designed to measure and control for subjects’ work ability and inherent labor-leisure pref-
erences, respectively. We detail in turn each of these three parts below. The experimental
instructions for all three parts appear in the Appendix.
2.1 Three Parts of the Experiment
a. Part One (Work Ability)
The common element to all three parts of the experiment is the real-eﬀort work task: each
4 Our paper also relates to an underdeveloped experimental literature on the responsiveness of labor
supply decisions to changes in the income tax system. Sillamaa (1999) shows that a top marginal income tax
rate of zero increases work eﬀort. Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2003) ﬁnd that tax revenues in a real-eﬀort
experiment support the existence of a Laﬀer curve.
4subject solves by hand two-digit by two-digit multiplication questions. Part One serves to
measure each subject’s innate ability or productivity at this task. Our objective is to create
a labor income tax and a theoretically equivalent consumption tax treatment balanced in
terms of subjects’ work abilities.
To measure each subject’s work ability, subjects are asked to solve as many multiplication
problems as they can in three minutes. To incentivize subjects, they are paid 0.5 shekel for
each correctly answered question.5 Throughout this and the other two parts, the subject
may observe both his numbers of correctly and incorrectly answered multiplication questions
and his cumulative earnings. (See the screenshot for Part One in the Appendix.)
At the completion of Part One, while subjects proceeded to Part Two, the software
ranked subjects according to the number of correctly solved multiplication questions. We
applied the rank-sorting algorithm displayed in Table 1 to assign each subject to either the
labor income tax or consumption tax treatment in Part Three. At the beginning of Part
Three, each subject receives the instructions only for the treatment to which he has been
assigned. Subjects are not made aware of the ranking algorithm, their overall ranking or the
existence of the other treatment in which they do not participate.
[insert Table 1 here]
The algorithm balances the two tax treatments in terms of the rankings of subjects’
work abilities. Table 1 indicates how this balance is achieved: the subjects with the highest
and fourth highest abilities are assigned to the consumption tax treatment (CT), while the
second and third highest ranking subjects are assigned to the labor income tax treatment
(IT). This “snake” pattern of subject assignment continues until all subjects are exhausted.
The result is that if the number of subjects in a session is a multiple of four, the average
5 One $USD equals about four Israeli shekels. To control for question diﬃculty across subjects, all subjects
saw the same series of randomly chosen multiplication questions in the same order. To minimize the variance
in question diﬃculty across questions, we excluded integers ending in “0” or “1”.
5ability ranking of the two treatments is identical; otherwise, the average ranking diﬀers by
a mere fraction for sessions with at least 17 subjects (applicable to all four of our sessions).
b. Part Two (Labor-Leisure Preferences)
The second part of the experiment measures subjects’ (pre-tax) labor-leisure preferences.
This second part consists of a two-stage, full-information, individual choice problem. In the
ﬁrst labor-leisure-allocation stage, the individual decides how much of the available three
minutes to devote to work in the form of solving multiplication problems. For each correctly
answered question, the subject earns two points that may be exchanged for either of the
two consumption goods in the second stage (as explained below). The subject may stop
working at any time during the three-minute round by pressing the “Stop” button. For
each 15 seconds that the individual chooses not to work (leisure), he earns one unit of the
leisure good (a voucher for a bottled soft drink).6 (Fractions of 15 seconds left on the
clock are worthless.) In the second, consumption stage of the round, the individual decides
how to allocate the points earned from the labor task between the two consumption goods
(vouchers redeemable for falafel sandwiches or pizza slices). In this pre-tax treatment, each
point earned can be exchanged for a half falafel sandwich or one pizza slice.7
Compared to Part One, this second part complicates the subject’s decision task in two
respects: the subject must ﬁrst decide how to allocate his three-minute endowment between
labor and leisure, and he must subsequently decide how to allocate his earned income between
the two consumption goods. Due to these additional complexities, we want to allow the
subject to repeat Part Two. At the same time, we recognize that solving multiplication
questions is mentally fatiguing and that this part’s main purpose is really to provide a
control for subjects’ preferences. We resolved these tradeoﬀs by having each subject play
6 Because subjects are conﬁned to the lab for the duration of the experiment, the use of a leisure good
ensures that they indeed derive utility from the time not spent working.
7 Pizza and falafel are the two most popular fast foods in Israel. Pizza is sold whole and by the slice;
falafel sandwiches are served in a half or full pita bread.
6two rounds of Part Two.
c. Part Three (Income tax or Consumption tax)
Part Three of the experiment is identical to Part Two, except that the subject now faces
either a labor income tax or a consumption tax, depending on the treatment to which he is
assigned (according to the sorting algorithm described in Part One). In the labor income
tax treatment (IT), a 50% wage tax is imposed on subjects’ earnings, meaning that for each
correctly answered multiplication question the subject earns one point (instead of two).8
The prices of half falafel sandwiches and pizza slices remain the same as in the pre-tax
treatment, namely, one point each.
Alternatively, in the consumption tax treatment (CT), a 100% consumption tax is im-
posed on each of the two consumption goods, meaning that a half falafel sandwich and a slice
of pizza now each cost two points (instead of one point each). As in the pre-tax treatment,
the value of a correctly answered question is two points.
The key feature of these two tax treatments is that the subjects in each treatment face
the identical post-tax budget line: a half falafel sandwich and one pizza slice each cost one
correctly answered multiplication question, while each soft drink costs 15 seconds not spent
on solving multiplication questions.9
The decision complexity of Part Three suggests that allowing subjects to repeat it will
provide us with more informed estimates of their preferences. At the same time, mental
fatigue and the intensity associated with solving multiplication problems under time pressure
severely limits the number of feasible repetitions. Given the centrality of this part of the
8 This treatment exempliﬁes the need to convert correct answers to smaller units. If we had paid subjects
directly in correctly answered questions, a subject who answers an odd number of questions would be left
with a fraction of a question after the wage tax.
9 To illustrate the equivalence, consider a subject who correctly answers ﬁve questions in 120 seconds,
leaving 60 seconds on the clock. In both IT and CT, the 60 seconds not devoted to the work task earn the
subject four units of the leisure good, bottled soft drinks. In IT, ﬁve questions pay ﬁve after-tax points,
exchangeable for ﬁve half falafel sandwiches, ﬁve pizza slices or some combination thereof. In CT, ﬁve
questions pay ten points, but the 100% tax on consumption goods make them exchangeable also for ﬁve half
falafel sandwiches, ﬁve pizza slices or some combination thereof.
7experiment, we chose to have each subject play three rounds.
2.2 Logic underlying Design Choices
Our experimental design is non-standard in several respects. Perhaps the most distinctive
feature of our design is the payment in kind, rather than in cash. We steered away from cash
or cash equivalents such as cell-phone credit in the choice of goods in order to avoid a corner
solution in subjects’ labor-leisure allocation. Put diﬀerently, if either the leisure good or one
of the consumption goods were overly attractive, subjects may have exclusively chosen this
good and remained insensitive to the imposition of a tax.
We include two consumption goods along with the leisure good to capture in the simplest
way the two typical tradeoﬀs faced by individuals: time allocation between labor and leisure
and earned-income allocation between commodities. We selected in-kind goods that are
similarly attractive to one another for a wide range of students, again to avoid a corner
solution. Months prior to the experiment, we conducted a questionnaire to determine the
set of goods to include in our design. The questionnaire elicits subjects’ preferences over
diﬀerent bundles of goods. The results revealed that falafel and pizza are equally well liked
substitutes and neither is chosen to the exclusion of the leisure good, soft drinks, which
serves as a complement.10
Payment according to subjects’ cumulative earnings across all rounds would invite sati-
ation, which would lead to diﬀerent labor-leisure-consumption choices across rounds. This
between-round variation is undesirable since it is an artifact of the payment calculation.
Accordingly, each subject was paid based on his results from one randomly chosen round
from each of the second and third parts of the experiment. This payment method serves to
10 The questionnaire asked each subject to allocate a hypothetical income among three goods in each
of the distinct bundles of goods. We conducted this questionnaire on 69 students at locations (Tel Aviv
University and Sapir College) diﬀerent from the site of our experiments (Ben-Gurion University) to avoid
any subjects from participating in both the questionnaire and subsequent experiment. The detailed ﬁndings
from the questionnaire are available upon request.
8avoid scenarios in which subjects concentrate their labor supply in one round and opt for
leisure in the remaining round(s) of the treatment.
The ﬁrst part allows us to balance the work-ability composition of the IT and CT treat-
ments and to explain a subject’s labor-leisure choice as a function of his observed labor
productivity. The second part provides an own-subject control for inherent labor-leisure
preferences. The time diﬀerence the subject devotes to the work task between the tax and
the pre-tax treatments will serve as one of our dependent measures.
2.3 Subjects and Payments
To ensure that our results are not attributable to subjects’ misunderstanding of the rules of
the experiment or the implications of the tax, we gave subjects a short quiz prior to beginning
Parts Two and Three to verify their knowledge of the prices of all goods.11 (Appendix
A includes these quizzes for the referees.) More important for understanding, we limited
participation to economics students. Eighty undergraduate majors in economics participated
in one of four sessions at Ben-Gurion University. The entire experiment took about one hour
and 45 minutes. The average cash payment from Part One was 3.0 NIS, while the average
payments in vouchers based on one randomly chosen round from both Parts Two and Three
were 7.7 bottled drinks, 6.3 half falafel sandwiches and 7.0 pizza slices. The vouchers were
valid for redemption for up to one year.
3 Results
Descriptive statistics for the two tax treatments (IT and CT) appear in Table 2. The ﬁrst row
conﬁrms the eﬀectiveness of the ability-sorting algorithm in balancing the two tax treatments
11 The subject answered the same set of questions in either IT or CT as in the previous no-tax treatment.
The fact that the answers change from the no-tax to the tax treatment highlights for the subject the eﬀect
of the tax on prices.
9in terms of subjects’ abilities. The average ability in IT is 5.87 questions compared to 5.60
questions in CT. A t-test of means (p = 0.64) and the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test of distributions (z = 0.427, p = 0.67) both indicate abilities are similarly
distributed in the two tax treatments.
[insert Table 2 here]
The next three rows indicate the overall average time (in seconds) devoted to labor supply
in the pre-tax treatment (before subjects knew of their assignment to, or even the existence
of, the tax treatment), the tax treatment and the change between these two treatments,
respectively. These numbers reveal that on average the substitution eﬀect dominates any
possible positive income eﬀect: subjects respond to the imposition of a tax by signiﬁcantly
reducing their labor supply in both treatments (p < 0.01 for both IT and CT). Of greater
interest, subjects reduce their labor supply by 1/3 or 44.5 seconds on average in IT compared
to the no-tax treatment, while in CT the decrease is only about 15% of the no-tax amount or
a 20.3-second decline on average. Treating each subject’s average response to the tax as the
unit of observation, both a t-test of means (p = .02) and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
(p = .03) show that subjects’ labor supply is signiﬁcantly more responsive to the income tax
than the consumption tax, as hypothesized. This diﬀerential response to the type of tax can
be seen in the distribution of subjects’ average labor supply responses displayed in Figure
1. A higher fraction of subjects in IT reduce their labor supply and by a larger amount in
response to the tax than in CT.
[insert Figure 1 here]
The ﬁgure also reveals that about a quarter of the subjects (21/80) curiously increase
their time devoted to the work task following the introduction of the tax. Also in line with
our hypothesis, 13 of these participated in CT compared to only eight in IT.
10We examined the two groups to determine whether observable diﬀerences may explain
their diﬀerential reactions to the tax. Table 3 shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms of
gender composition, labor market ability, pre-tax labor supply or leisure choices between
those who lowered and those who raised their post-tax labor supply. The similarity of these
two groups in terms of ability and labor supply contradicts the conventional depiction of the
backward-bending portion of the labor supply curve as applicable to high-income individuals:
there is nothing distinctive about the subjects with a negative income elasticity.12
[insert Table 3 here]
Turning to a more formal analysis of the response to the two taxes, we begin with the
following OLS regression speciﬁcation,
∆worktimei = constant + β1 · abilityi + β2 · IT + i
where ∆worktimei denotes the diﬀerence between subject i’s time devoted to the labor task
in the tax treatment averaged over all three rounds minus this subject’s time devoted to
the labor task in the pre-tax treatment averaged over both rounds; abilityi is the number
of multiplication questions subject i correctly answered in Part One, while IT is an indi-
cator variable equal to one for the income tax treatment and zero for the consumption tax
treatment.
[insert Table 4 here]
The highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of −24.2 in regression (1) of Table 4 conﬁrms our main
hypothesis: subjects reduce their labor supply by an additional 24 seconds on average in
12 One explanation for this seemingly irrational behavior is that the subject aspires to a target income in
order to purchase a speciﬁc number of falafel sandwiches or pizza slices. To achieve this, the subject works
longer in the presence of the tax than in its absence. Camerer et al. (1997) found that New York City cab
drivers – another not particularly high income group – set a daily earnings target, which led them to work
longer hours on slow days and to quit early on busy days.
11response to the income tax compared to the equivalent consumption tax. Repeating the
exercise with the subject’s own ability as a control yields a similar result: the coeﬃcient of
−23.9 on IT in (2) is signiﬁcant at the 3% level.
Let us now make use of the entire panel dataset for all 80 subjects, each of whom par-
ticipated in two no-tax rounds and three tax rounds facing either an income tax (IT) or a
consumption tax (CT). Table 5 reports the regression results with subject i’s worktime in
round t as the dependent variable. The random-eﬀects regression results in (3) reveal that
subjects reduce their labor supply by 39 seconds on average when exposed to the income tax,
while those who face the consumption tax work 21 seconds less compared to their pre-tax
labor supply. Both of these coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the (omitted) no-tax
labor supply and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other at less than the 1% level. These
coeﬃcients remain unchanged when the subject’s own ability at the labor task is included in
regression (4). The abilityi variable is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 in this or any other
regression we ran, nor is it or ability2
i ever signiﬁcant when the latter is included. In (5), we
interact abilityi with both the no-tax and the tax-inclusive rounds to allow for a subject’s
labor productivity to aﬀect diﬀerently his labor supply in the presence of the tax. A sub-
stitution eﬀect would render the distortive eﬀect of a tax more pronounced for high-ability
individuals, with an income eﬀect potentially oﬀsetting this pattern to some extent. The
insigniﬁcance of the abilityi ∗ tax coeﬃcient suggests these two forces oﬀset one another. In
fact, neither of the interaction terms (or their squared terms when included) is signiﬁcant,
while the gap in the labor supply between the two tax treatments remains highly signiﬁcant
(p < .01).
[insert Table 5 here]
Learning is a common phenomenon in individual choice experiments. With successive
rounds a subject may become more adept at solving multiplication questions or more fa-
tigued. To determine whether subjects’ labor supply decisions display a time trend, round-
12speciﬁc dummy variables are included in all of the above regressions in Table 5. However,
since none of the round dummies is signiﬁcant in any of the regressions, they are not reported.
As a robustness test, regression (6) excludes the ﬁrst round in both the no-tax and the tax
treatments to account for possible learning and focus on the second no-tax round and last
two after-tax rounds. The coeﬃcients on IT (−41.1) and CT (−25.5) both increase slightly
compared to (4) and the main conclusions remain the same: both coeﬃcients continue to be
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 1% level and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other at
the 5% level, despite using only 3/5 of the data.
To account for the fact that the decision space in our experiment is censored from below at
0 seconds and from above at 180 seconds, we report the marginal eﬀects from random-eﬀects,
double-censored Tobit regressions in (7) and (8). Eleven percent of the total observations
(45 of the total 400 rounds) are right-censored with subjects devoting all of their time to
the labor market. The observation that the majority of these observations (26/45) appear
in the no-tax rounds (despite there being only two such rounds) attests to subjects’ labor
supply sensitivity, even for the subjects’ most devoted to the work task. Ten additional
right-censored observations appear in CT with the remaining nine observations in IT.
At the other extreme, because consuming all leisure involves pressing three buttons in
sequence, each located on a diﬀerent location of the computer screen, it is physically impos-
sible to stop the clock with the entire 180 seconds intact.13 Still, the intention to consume
all leisure is revealed in 21 instances in which the subject stopped the clock between 1 and 6
seconds after the round began and didn’t answer a single question. Indeed, with no instance
in which the clock was stopped after 7 to 10 seconds had elapsed, six seconds elapsed stands
out as the natural threshold for subjects desiring to consume exclusively leisure.
13 The subject ﬁrst needs to press the “Start” button which starts the clock, then presses “Cancel” on the
message box containing the multiplication question and ﬁnally presses the “Stop” button (see the screenshot
in the Appendix).
13Revealingly, 17 of the 21 instances in which the clock was stopped before 7 seconds
elapsed occurred in IT; the other four observations occurred in CT with no single attempt
to consume all leisure in the no-tax treatment. Put another way, all instances of voluntary
unemployment occur after taxes are introduced, with over 80% of them in the income tax
treatment. A χ2-test of proportions shows that these diﬀerences are highly signiﬁcant (p
< .0001, df = 2).
In Tobit regressions (7) and (8), the dependent variable worktime
0
it is adjusted to take on
the value of 0 for all values 0 to 6 seconds and equals worktimeit for all other values. As in
the OLS regressions, the coeﬃcients on IT and CT continue to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from zero
and from one other at the 1% level. Again, none of the round dummy variables included (but
not reported) in (7) is signiﬁcant. Alternatively, we account for possible learning in Tobit
(8) by excluding the ﬁrst round in both the no-tax and the tax treatments, as we did in OLS
regression (6). Labor supply in these later rounds of the tax treatments remain signiﬁcantly
lower than the second pre-tax round, and the highly signiﬁcant gap in labor supply between
IT and CT persists (p < .01).14
4 A Theoretical Explanation
In this section, we present a simple behavioral model of myopic agents.15 The model is
consistent with our main ﬁnding that individuals choose a higher labor supply under a
consumption tax than under an equivalent labor income tax. We employ this model to
14 The Tobit regressions are estimated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 12 points of evaluation
(Stata’s default). As a robustness check, we estimate (7) and (8) based on both 8 and 16 quadrature points.
The coeﬃcients on IT and CT change by less than 1% and remain highly signiﬁcant. The abilityi coeﬃcient
is more sensitive, shrinking by as much as 40% for higher accuracy of 16 points and increasing up to 59% in
(8) (but still insigniﬁcant) when accuracy falls to 8 points.
15 In the behavioral economics literature, myopia has been alternately interpreted as impatience (i.e., high
exponential discount rate), present-biased preferences (i.e., hyperbolic discounting) and a short decision-
making horizon. Semantics aside, we capture myopia here through individuals’ beliefs rather than preferences
and take it to mean an underestimation of the consequences of deferred events.
14demonstrate that a shift from an income to a consumption tax reduces excess burden.
Consider a standard labor supply model with a representative individual whose utility is
given by U(c,`) = c−h(`), where c denotes consumption, ` denotes labor and h is assumed
to be strictly increasing and strictly convex.16
The production function employs labor only and exhibits constant returns to scale. We
denote by w > 0 the individual’s hourly productivity (hence the competitive wage rate).
We normalize the price of the consumption good to unity, without loss of generality. The
(myopic) individual is faced with the following (perceived) budget constraint:
` · w · (1 − t) + τ = c · (1 + α · s), (1)
where t < 1 is the (ﬂat) tax rate on labor income (wages), τ denotes a lump-sum transfer (a
tax if negative) and s is the tax rate on consumption. The parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 measures the
individual’s degree of myopia. When α = 1 the individual is fully rational and perceives the
consumption tax and the corresponding budget constraint correctly, in accordance with neo-
classical consumer theory. When α < 1 the individual underestimates the burden associated
with a consumption tax.17 Based on his perceived budget constraint in (1), the individual
determines his labor supply and earns the commensurate income. Finally, he spends this
income on the consumption good, subject (regrettably) to the true budget constraint (as if
α = 1 in (1)).
We now demonstrate that when the individual underestimates the consumption tax bur-
den, levying a consumption tax entails a smaller excess burden than that associated with
an equivalent wage tax (while the individual is indiﬀerent between the two tax regimes).
Formally, we prove the following:
16 Diamond (1998), among others, also uses a quasi-linear speciﬁcation for simplicity. Our qualitative
results are robust to more general utility functions.
17 Chetty et al. (2007) employ a similar formulation to study the role of tax salience in consumer purchasing
decisions. In our model, tax misperception is exogenously given and is measured along a continuum, whereas
Chetty et al. treat individuals’ misperception as a costly binary choice between full attention and complete
inattention to the sales tax added at the cash register to the posted price.
15Proposition: When α < 1, a shift from a wage tax to a consumption tax generates
strictly higher tax revenues while leaving the individual’s utility unchanged.
Proof: Consider a wage tax regime (BWT in Figure 2); that is, we set t > 0 and s = τ = 0.
Denote the wage tax rate by tWT. Let `WT and UWT denote the individual’s choice of labor
supply under the wage tax regime and his corresponding utility level, respectively. Let `NT
be the individual’s choice of labor supply under a no-tax regime (i.e., setting s = t = τ = 0,
given by BNT in Figure 2). By virtue of our quasi-linear speciﬁcation, `NT equals the choice
of labor supplied under a lump-sum tax regime (i.e., setting τ < 0 and s = t = 0 ), which
entails no deadweight loss. Note further that `NT > `WT, since labor supply is strictly





In words, cNT is the level of consumption that yields the individual the same utility level as
that obtained under a wage tax regime when the individual works `NT hours.
[insert Figure 2 here]
We ﬁrst examine the simple case α = 0. Consider a consumption tax regime (i.e., s > 0
and t = τ = 0). Denote the consumption tax rate by sCT, where sCT is given by the implicit
solution to:
`
NT · w = c
NT · (1 + s
CT). (3)
In words, the consumption tax rate is set such that the consumption-labor pair (cNT, `NT)
lies on the after-tax budget line BCT shown in Figure 2. Since α = 0 (implying the individual
is oblivious to the tax), an individual faced with the consumption tax regime chooses to work
`NT hours. His resultant utility equals UWT according to (2). The tax revenues raised by
the consumption tax regime thus equal the tax revenues that would be raised by a lump-sum
tax regime (for the same utility level) which, by deﬁnition, are higher than the tax revenues
from the wage tax regime. This completes the proof for the case α = 0.
16We turn next to the case 0 < α < 1. Denote by `
0 the amount of labor chosen by an
individual faced with a consumption tax rate given by the implicit solution to (3). Due to the
strict concavity of the utility function, the marginal tax rate associated with the consumption
tax regime is lower than that associated with the wage tax regime; formally, 1
1+sCT > 1−tWT
(alternatively, BCT is steeper than BWT). Thus, `WT < `
0 < `NT. The ﬁrst inequality follows
from both the fact that labor supply strictly increases with respect to the net-of-tax wage
rate and the individual’s misperception of the consumption tax (α < 1); whereas the second
inequality follows from both the positive slope of labor supply with respect to the net-of-tax
wage rate and α > 0. Let c
0 represent the individual’s consumption level from `
0. It follows
from the strict concavity of the utility function that U(c
0,`
0) > UWT. In other words, the
bundle (c
0, `
0) lies above the indiﬀerence curve UWT (see Figure 2).
Consider now an alternative consumption tax regime. Denote the consumption tax by
sWT, where sWT is given by the implicit solution to:
`
WT · w = c
WT · (1 + s
WT). (4)
That is, we set a consumption tax rate that yields an after-tax budget line identical to that
of the wage tax regime (BWT). Denote by c
00 and `
00, respectively, the consumption level and
the amount of labor chosen by the individual faced with the consumption tax regime in (4).
Similar to the above reasoning, it follows that `WT < `
00 < `NT . Thus, U(c
00,`
00) < UWT. In
other words, the bundle (c
00, `
00 ) lies below the indiﬀerence curve UWT (see Figure 2). Since
the utility function is continuous, the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists
some consumption tax rate, ˆ s, where sCT < ˆ s < sWT, with the individual’s corresponding
consumption and labor choices given by ˆ c and ˆ `, such that U(ˆ c, ˆ `) = UWT (given by point
A in the ﬁgure). Moreover, `WT < ˆ ` < `NT. A shift from a wage tax to a consumption
tax at the rate ˆ s moves the individual along the indiﬀerence curve UWT towards the bundle
(cNT, `NT) chosen under a lump-sum tax (set to maximize tax revenues, by construction).
Consequently, the tax revenues from the consumption tax ˆ s are strictly higher than those
17from the wage tax tWT. 
From the proof of the proposition, we observed that a shift from a wage tax to a theo-
retically equivalent consumption tax induces a myopic agent (α < 1) to work longer. This
shift yields higher tax revenues, but, at the same time, reduces the agent’s utility (the bun-
dle (c
00,l
00) lies below the indiﬀerence curve UWT). We demonstrated that by lowering the
consumption tax rate below this theoretically equivalent level, tax revenues remain higher
than those obtained under the wage tax while restoring the agent’s utility to UWT. This
establishes the eﬃciency gain from a shift to a consumption tax.
5 Concluding Remarks
Two often-raised arguments in favor of a shift to a consumption tax are the administrative
advantages it oﬀers over an income tax (i.e., simplicity of measuring consumption versus labor
income and ease of collection and enforcement) and the elimination of the inter-temporal
distortion of consumption allocation caused by the taxation of capital income. Our paper
uncovers evidence for an additional, perceptual advantage: post-paid consumption taxes
encourage higher labor supply than equivalent pre-paid wage taxes. This result holds for
both men and women and across the spectrum of labor market productivities. Consumption
taxes also appear to reduce the likelihood of voluntary unemployment. These ﬁndings violate
the equivalence between these labor-income and consumption taxes upon which the optimal
tax literature is premised. Whether these violations hold over the longer run remains an
open research question. For our part and constrained by the tiresome nature of our real-
eﬀort task, we permitted learning by having each subject repeat the same labor-leisure choice
over several rounds. Over this horizon, the observed signiﬁcantly higher labor supply under
a consumption tax endures.
The mechanism at work appears to be similar to behavioral explanations for overeating
18and the excess credit card debt phenomenon. Individuals underestimate the future costs
of current consumption decisions. Similarly, we observe that taxpayers underestimate the
costs to be incurred from taxes levied on their deferred consumption when they make their
labor-leisure choices.18
Myopia in our setting, as in the above-mentioned examples, harms the individual by
leading to sub-optimal choices (overworking in our case). This creates the potential for a
welfare-improving government response. Much of the policy reform debate in the U.S. favors
a pre-paid consumption tax such as the individual cash-ﬂow tax (that could take the form
of a traditional Section 408 Individual Retirement Account), which is essentially a wage tax,
over a post-paid consumption tax (such as VAT) as a candidate to replace income tax. Our
evidence, to the contrary, makes a case for adopting the latter, since post-paid consumption
taxes appear to mitigate labor disincentives, thereby enhancing the eﬃciency of the tax
system. In particular, we propose a simple theoretical model consistent with our ﬁndings
and show that for any wage tax rate, one can appropriately choose a consumption tax rate
below the theoretically equivalent level to achieve higher labor supply and therefore higher
tax revenues, while maintaining the individual’s utility.
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21Instructions for Participant 
 
This  is  a  decision-making  experiment  in  time  and  resource  allocation.  Funds  for  this 
experiment have been provided by an external research foundation. Take the time to read 
carefully the instructions. A good understanding of the instructions and well thought out 
decisions during the experiment can earn you a considerable remuneration. Earnings from 
the experiment will be paid at the end of the experiment to you in cash and in vouchers 
exchangeable for goods. The experiment consists of three parts. Below are the instructions 




During the first part of this experiment, you will be given three minutes to solve as many 
two-digit by two-digit multiplication questions as possible. This preliminary exercise will 
allow you to familiarize yourself with the software in preparation for the second and third 
parts of the experiment. For each correctly answered question in this part, you will earn 0.5 
shekel to be paid in cash at the end of the experiment  
 
This completes the instructions for Part One of the experiment. If you have any questions, 
please raise your hand and a monitor will come to assist you. 
 
Below is an example of a screenshot from Part One of the experiment. 






This second part of the experiment consists of two stages, time and salary allocation stages. 
In the first time-allocation stage, you are given three minutes. You need to decide how much 
of this time you wish to devote to answering multiplication questions. For each correctly 
answered question, you earn two points. You will be able to redeem your total earned points 
for falafel sandwiches and pizza slices, as explained below. At any time during these three 
minutes,  you  may  choose  to  stop  answering  questions  by  pressing  "Cancel"  instead  of 
answering the question and then by pressing the "Stop" button. Whatever time remains from 
the  initial  three  minutes  is  converted  to  bottled  soft  drinks  according  to  the  following 
exchange rate: every 15 seconds remaining on the clock is worth one bottled soft drink. 





You will now be asked to allocate the points you earned from the first time-allocation stage 
(at a rate of 2 points per correctly answered question) between half falafel sandwiches and 
pizza slices. Each point can be exchanged for either a two half falafel sandwiches or two 
pizza slices. You must spend all of your earned points on any combination you like of half 
falafel sandwiches and pizza slices. Note that the bottled soft drinks you earned in the first 
stage cannot be exchanged for falafel sandwiches or pizza slices. Below is an example of a 
screenshot from the point-allocation stage of the experiment. Please take a look at this now. 
 
After you have decided how to allocate your earned points between half falafel sandwiches 
and pizza slices, press the "Confirm Choice" button, followed by the "Proceed to the Next 




At the end of the experiment, you will be paid the money you earned from correctly solving 
multiplication questions in the first part. Of the two rounds of the second part, one round will 
be randomly chosen and you will be given vouchers for the number of bottled soft drinks, 
half falafel sandwiches and pizza slices that you earned in the randomly chosen round. The 
falafel vouchers are valid for redemption for up to one year at Falafel El HaNegev in Mercaz 
Oren. The pizza vouchers are valid for redemption for up to one year at American Pizza also 
in Mercaz Oren. The soft drink vouchers are redeemable for up to one year at either Falafel 
El HaNegev or American Pizza in Mercaz Oren.  
 
This completes the instructions for Part Two of the experiment. If you have any questions, 
please raise your hand and a monitor will come to assist you. 
 Below are two examples of screenshots from Part Two, the first from the time-allocation 
stage and the second from the point-allocation stage. 
 Participant:  ______ 
 
Instructions for Participant 
 
Part 3 – Tax on Prices of Goods 
 
Time-Allocation Stage  
 
The time-allocation stage of the third part is identical to that of the second part. That is, you 
are given three minutes during which time you must decide how much of the three minutes 
to devote to answering multiplication questions in exchange for points and how much of the 
three  minutes  to  preserve  in  exchange  for  bottled  soft  drinks.  Each  correctly  answered 
question  earns  you  two  points  redeemable  for  falafel  sandwiches  and  pizza  slices,  as 
explained below. For every 15 seconds you choose to preserve on the clock you earn one 
bottled soft drink. Below is an example of a screenshot from the time-allocation stage of the 




Like the point-allocation stage of the second part of the experiment, you will now be asked 
to allocate the points you earned from the first time-allocation stage (at a rate of 2 points per 
correctly answered question) between half falafel sandwiches and pizza slices. However, 
there is now a tax on the prices of these two goods such that the price of each good including 
the  tax  is  double  the  price  paid  in  the  second  part.  In  other  words,  each  point  can  be 
exchanged for either half a falafel sandwich or one pizza slice. You must spend all of your 
earned points on any combination you like of falafel sandwiches and pizza slices. Note that 
the bottled soft drinks you earned in the first stage are not subject to the tax and cannot be 
exchanged for falafel sandwiches or pizza slices. Below is an example of a screenshot from 
the point-allocation stage of the experiment. Please take a look at this now. 
 
After you have decided how to allocate your earned points between half falafel sandwiches 
and pizza slices, press the "Confirm Choice" button, followed by the "Proceed to the Next 




At the end of the experiment, you will be paid the money you earned from correctly solving 
multiplication questions in Part One.  You will also be paid the number of vouchers for 
bottled  soft  drinks,  half  falafel  sandwiches  and  pizza  slices  that  you  earned  from  one 
randomly chosen round of Part Two. Finally, you will receive additional vouchers for bottled 
soft drinks, half falafel sandwiches and pizza slices according to your earnings from one 
randomly chosen round among the three in which you participated in this Part Three of the 
experiment. The falafel vouchers may be redeemed at Falafel El Hanegev in Mercaz Oren. 
The pizza vouchers may be redeemed at American Pizza also in Mercaz Oren. The soft drink 
vouchers may be redeemed at either Falafel El Hanegev or American Pizza in Mercaz Oren. 
All vouchers are valid for up to one year. 
 
This completes the instructions for this part of the experiment. If you have any questions, 
please raise your hand and a monitor will come to assist you. Below are two examples of screenshots from Part Three, the first from the time-allocation 
stage and the second from the point-allocation stage. 
 
  
Participant   ______ 
 
Instructions for Participant 
 




Like the time-allocation part of the second part, you are given three minutes during which 
time you must decide how much of the three minutes to devote to answering multiplication 
questions in exchange for points and how much of the three minutes to preserve in exchange 
for bottled soft drinks. However, there is now a tax on the points you earn. Each correctly 
answered question earns you two points. But with the tax on the points you will keep half of 
the total points  you earn.  In other words,  your net income is 1 point for each correctly 
answered question. These points are redeemable for falafel sandwiches and pizza slices, as 
explained below. You must spend all of your earned points on any combination you like of 
falafel sandwiches and pizza slices. For every 15 seconds you choose to preserve on the 
clock you earn one bottled soft drink. Note that the bottled soft drinks you earn are not 
subject to the tax. 
 
Point Allocation  
 
The point-allocation part of the third stage is identical to that of the second part. That is, you 
will now be asked to allocate the points you earned from the first time-allocation part (at a 
rate of 2 points per correctly answered question) between half falafel sandwiches and pizza 
slices. Each point can be exchanged for either two half falafel sandwiches or two pizza 
slices. You must spend all of your earned points on any combination you like of half falafel 
sandwiches and pizza slices. Note that the bottled soft drinks you earned in the first part 
cannot be exchanged for falafel sandwiches or pizza slices. 
 
After you have decided how to allocate your earned points between half falafel sandwiches 
and pizza slices, press the "Confirm Choice" button, followed by the "Proceed to the Next 




At the end of the experiment, you will be paid the money you earned from correctly solving 
multiplication questions in Part One.  You will also be paid the number of vouchers for 
bottled  soft  drinks,  half  falafel  sandwiches  and  pizza  slices  that  you  earned  from  one 
randomly chosen round of Part Two. Finally, you will receive additional vouchers for bottled 
soft drinks, half falafel sandwiches and pizza slices according to your earnings from one 
randomly chosen round among the three in which you participated in this Part Three of the 
experiment. The falafel vouchers may be redeemed at Falafel El Hanegev in Mercaz Oren. 
The pizza vouchers may be redeemed at American Pizza also in Mercaz Oren. The soft drink 
vouchers may be redeemed at either Falafel El Hanegev or American Pizza in Mercaz Oren. 
All vouchers are valid for up to one year. 
 
This completes the instructions for this part of the experiment. If you have any questions, 
please raise your hand and a monitor will come to assist you. Below are two examples of screenshots from Part Three, the first from the time-allocation 
















To balance the two tax treatments in terms of labor market productivity, subjects in
a session are assigned to either the consumption tax treatment (CT) or income tax
treatment (IT) according to the displayed ability-ranking algorithm.
Treatment
Mean Mean













Averages by tax and pre-tax treatment (standard deviations below in parentheses). Labor








pre-tax units of leisure
after-tax units of leisure
















Table 1 - Ability-sorting algorithm
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics by Tax Treatment
40The subject's average time devoted to the work task in the three rounds of the tax treatment minus the two-round average from the
pre-tax treatment is displayed for each subject by tax treatment. Observations are arranged in ascending order along the horizontal axis.  

































ITLower After-Tax  Higher After-Tax 















 male 46 (78.0%) 14 (66.7%)
 subjects 59 21
Means (std. deviations) by those who lowered and those who raised their
labor supply in response to introduction of the tax (CT and IT pooled).







 variable \ grouping
-6.36 -3.22




 pre-tax leisure(1) (2)
coefficient coefficient







 Number of Obs. 80 80
 adjusted R
2 0.05 0.04
The dependent variable is subject i's change in average worktime from the no-tax to the tax treatment.
*** p-value less than .01 **  p-value less than .05        *  p-value less than .10
Subject i's average change in labor supply in response to the tax is regressed on the type of tax faced 
(IT equals one for income tax) and the subject's labor market productivity (in (2)). Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors in parentheses.
 constant
 ---
Table 4 - OLS regressions on Change in After-Tax Labor Supply
 IT
 variable
 ability iTable 5 - Random-effects OLS and Random-effects double-censored Tobit panel regressions
method  OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
variable \ equation  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-38.9*** -39.0*** -36.5*** -41.1*** -37.2*** -42.4***
(6.0) (6.0) (7.0) (6.2) (6.2) (6.3)
-20.7*** -20.7*** -18.3*** -25.5*** -19.8*** -26.1***
(6.0) (6.0) (6.9) (6.2) (6.1) (6.4)
0.90 0.68 1.15 0.40





135.2 130.1 128.2 132.5
(5.2) (10.5) (10.9) (11.3)
 Number of Obs. 400 400 400 240 400 240
  ρ .505 .508 .510 .482 .532 .490
  R
2 / Log L .11 .11 .11 .10 -1817 -1106
*** p-value less than .01       **  p-value less than .05        *  p-value less than .10
The dependent variable is subject i's worktime in round t.
Random-effects OLS coefficients and marginal effects from random-effects, double-censored Tobit regressions with treatment 
dummy variables (IT and CT) and the subject's own labor productivity (subject i) as the regressors. Regressions (3), (4), (5) 
and (7) make use of the 2 pre-tax rounds and all 3 after-tax rounds, and include round dummy variables. Regressions (6) and (8) 
exclude the first round of data of each treatment.
 IT
 CT
 ability i  ---
 ---  ---
 ---
 ability i* notax  ---  ---
 constant  ---  ---
 ---  ---  ---














Figure 2 – Efficiency gain from a shift to a Consumption TaxCESifo Working Paper Series 
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